Introduction
• Economic and fiscal disparities among regions • Local Allocation Tax (LAT) grants from the central government have a function of interregional income redistribution.
• Defects of the LAT grants
Flypaper effect: Nagamine (1995) , Doi (1996 Doi ( , 2000 Subsidy effect: Hayashi (2000) , Doi and Bessho (2005) Soft budget constraints: Akai, Sato, and Yamashita (2005) Poverty traps in the Japanese intergovernmental system • Suggestion of the former governor of Tottori prefecture Yoshihiro Katayama (his presentation at the Decentralization Reform Committee on September 18, 2007) In this paper,
•
Investigate poverty traps with the LAT grants Explain the system of the LAT grants Effects of the LAT grants on economic growth using a simple dynamic model Implement Granger (non-)causality test with panel data in Japan to confirm poverty traps with the LAT grants Gini Coefficients 
Micro-Allocation Rule of LAT Grants
Source: Doi and Ihori (2009) 2. System of Local Allocation Tax grants Table 1 Calculation of the Standard Financial Need (Outline) _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Police expenses = unit cost of police officer * number of police officers * adjustment coefficient Education expenses = unit cost of teacher * number of teachers * adjustment coefficient Public works expenses = … Agriculture, forestry, and fishery expenses = … Commerce and industry expenses = … Debt-service expenses = … … _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Sum of the above amount = the Standard Financial Need of this local government _____________________________________________________________________________________________ Note: * means 'multiplied by'.
Source: Doi and Ihori (2009) 3. A simple model of poverty traps with LAT grants 3.1 Basic framework
The local government of region i (in a small open economy) 
where τ C : national tax rate for fiscal transfer from the central government.
Production function in this region 
Substituting (7) into (2), , 
The condition for government investment is distorted by the LAT grants (the SFR).
(8) implies the government investment x i,t decreases compared with the benchmark case.
Specify a function form
The production function is assumed to be the following AK function.
, , (1 ) (1 ) ( )
The growth rate of capital ( 1 ) ( ) 1 In this situation, the steady state of regional income is zero. That is a kind of poverty traps due to the LAT grants like the kleptocratic poverty trap, introduced by Azariadis (2006) .
Effects of the Standard Financial Need in the LAT grants
In addition to (7), including compensation for government investment
max (1) subject to (2") and (3).
Empirical analyses of poverty traps
Confirm whether the LAT grants enhance or deteriorate regional economic growth by using panel data on the Japanese regional economy and local public finance. Hurlin and Venet (2004 ), and Hurlin (2005 , 2008 , , , , 1 1
Panel Granger (non-)causality test
Analogy from Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) to test the unit root hypothesis. Set the following null hypothesis in (10) (the homogenous non-causality (HNC) hypothesis)
The alternative hypothesis is 
